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Abstract
In this paper we consider communication from a source to a destination over a wireless network with the help
of a set of authenticated relays. We focus on a special “diamond” network, where there is no direct link between
the source and the destination; however the relay nodes help to establish such a communication. There is a single
adversarial node which injects signals to disrupt this communication. Like the source, it can only influence the
destination through the relays. We develop an approximate characterization of the reliable transmission rate in the
presence of such an adversary. This is done by developing an outer bound, and demonstrating an achievable strategy
that is within a constant number of bits of the outer bound, regardless of the channel values. A deterministic version
of the same problem is solved exactly, yielding insights which are used in the approximate characterization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication is inherently susceptible to malicious interference attempting to disrupt communications.
An adversary can utilize the broadcast medium to insert disruptive signals. This problem has been well-studied for
point-to-point communication, with early works in arbitrarily varying channels (AVC) [1]. This topic has not received
significant attention in the context of wireless networks, where there are relay nodes to assist communication. In
this paper we formulate and study coding strategies in this problem for a simple relay network.
The question of characterizing the capacity of wireless networks, even without the presence of malicious nodes,
has been an open question for many decades. Recently there has been progress on this question by looking for an
approximate characterization of the capacity [2]. Underlying this is an examination of the capacity of a deterministic
model that focuses on the signal interaction rather than the noise [3]. Using this deterministic model, it was shown
that an exact capacity characterization can be obtained in the form of an information-theoretic max-flow min-cut
result; a first such result when there is both broadcast and multiple access interference in the signal interactions.
This deterministic approach also gives insights that are used in obtaining the approximate characterization in noisy
(Gaussian) wireless networks. In this paper we build on these ideas by first examining the impact of the adversarial
node on a wireless network modeled using a linear deterministic signal interaction. In particular, we study both the
deterministic and Gaussian versions of the diamond wireless network depicted in Figures 2 and 1, respectively.
The role of malicious jamming nodes in wired networks has received recent significant attention in network coded
systems (see [4], [5] and references therein). However, the problem in wireless networks is quite different due to
the signal interactions caused by the broadcast nature of the channel. We will utilize the fact that the disrupting
signal transmitted by the adversary (see Figure 1) cause the received signals at the authenticated relays to be related
to each other. We use this in order to neutralize the adversarial signal without separating it from the legitimate
transmitted signal. This technique is adapted from a coding technique, termed interference neutralization, developed
for the the relay-interference network in [6], [7]. The idea is that we utilize the “correlation” in the received signal
at the relays to cancel part of the undesired adversarial signal. A similar idea is used in [8] for an amplify-forward
relaying strategy to reduce the interference at the receiver, and assuming a sum power constraint at the relays allows
to utilize a beam-forming strategy.
The main contributions of this paper are the following. We formulate the problem of adversarial jamming for
a wireless (diamond) network and provide an outer bound as well as achievable strategies for this network. In
particular, we show an exact characterization of reliable transmission rate for a diamond network with linear
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2deterministic model [3]. The coding strategy for this case crucially utilizes the interference neutralization technique
developed in [6]. The deterministic version of this problem is studied for some regimes of parameters in a recent
work [9]. However, here we generalize the deterministic characterization for arbitrary channel parameters. More
importantly, we show that the achievable strategy inspired by the deterministic analysis is within a constant number
of bits of the outer bound in the Gaussian case.
We describe the problem and main results in Section II. The analysis for linear deterministic networks is given
in Section III. Section IV develops the outer bound and the achievable strategy for the Gaussian case. The results
present in this work lead to several natural questions on the generalizations to arbitrary networks, multiple adversaries
etc. These are topics of future work.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider the diamond network in Fig. 1, where the source wishes to send the messageW reliably to the destination
D. It encodes the message and broadcasts X n to the relays B1 and B2 through the Gaussian channels. However,
the relays receive interference from an adversarial node A, who wishes to jam the transmission by inserting noise
to the system. The signal received by the relays can be written as
y1[t] =
√
f1x[t] +
√
g1u[t] + z1[t]
y2[t] =
√
f2x[t] +
√
g2u[t] + z2[t],
where x is the transmitted signal by the source, u is the interfering signal inserted by the jammer, and z1 and z2
are the additive white Gaussian noise with unit variance over each channel. The relay nodes perform any (causal)
processing on their received signal sequences {y1[t]} and {y2[t]} respectively, to obtain their transmitting signal
sequences, {x1(t)} and {x2(t)}. The received signals at the destination nodes from the Gaussian multiple access
channel can be written as
y[t] =
√
h1x1[t] +
√
h2x2[t] + z[t],
and wishes to decode M based on its received signal. We also assume equal power constraints for the source,
relays, and adversarial node, that is, E[x2] ≤ 1, E[x21] ≤ 1, E[x22] ≤ 1, and E[u2] ≤ 1.
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Fig. 1. Transmission model; Source node S wishes to communicate to D, while the system is jammed by the adversarial node A.
The AVC problem in a point-to-point system is studied under two assumptions [1]: (a) there exists common
randomness shared between the source and destination, unknown to adversary; This facilitates the use of random
codebooks chosen using the common randomness; (b) if there is no such a common randomness, and a fixed
codebook is used for transmission. Though we present the work for case (a), i.e., shared secret common randomness
between source and the relays, these results can be easily extended to case (b).
Our main result is the (approximate) capacity from S to D, in the presence of an adversarial jammer A.
3Theorem 1. The randomized capacity of the network in Figure 1 satisfies
C ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
f1 + f2 + (
√
f1g2 −
√
f2g1)2
1 + g1 + g2
)
, (1)
C ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 + (
√
h1 +
√
h2)2
)
, (2)
C ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
f1
1 + g1
)
+
1
2
log(1 + h2), (3)
C ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
f2
1 + g2
)
+
1
2
log(1 + h1). (4)
Moreover, for any C which satisfies (1)-(4), the rate R = C − 4 is achievable.
A trivial sub-optimal scheme here is to treat the interference as independent noises, and follow the known schemes
for noisy diamond relay network [3]. However, such noises are correlated since they are generated by the same
jamming source. This correlation can be utilized to significantly improve the communication rate.
We first study a deterministic version of these problems by using the linear deterministic model introduced in
[3]. In this model the randomness of the noise is ignored by considering the Gaussian noise’s effect as limiting the
precision of the received signal to a certain level, and focus on the signal interaction instead. An exact capacity
characterization is obtained for the deterministic version of the problem.
The deterministic case analysis is then translated into a universally approximate characterization for the (noisy)
Gaussian network. In fact, we use the insights given by analysis of the network in deterministic model for both
deriving an upper bound for the capacity, as well as proposing an (approximately) optimal encoding strategy which
leads to a lower bound for the capacity within a constant bit gap from the upper bound.
III. A DETERMINISTIC APPROACH
In this section we study the same problem in a deterministic framework introduced in [3].
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Fig. 2. The deterministic model of the problem.
The deterministic model of the problem is shown in Figure 2, where source node S wishes to communicate its
message to the destination node D via the relay nodes B1 and B2. The channels from source to relays are modeled
by M1 and M2 and from the relays to the destination are denoted by N1 and N2. We also use P1 and P2 to denote
the transition matrix from the adversarial node to the relays. Similar lowercase letters are used to denote the rank
of the matrices (channel gains). Therefore, the transmission over the first and second layers of the network can be
respectively written as
Yi[t] = MiX[t] +QiU [t], i = 1, 2, (5)
and
Y [t] = N1X1[t] +N2X2[t] (6)
4where here X, U , Y1 and Y2 are vectors of length p with elements form a finite field F, and the channel matrices
are powers of the lower triangular matrix J, e.g., M1 = Jp−m1 , were J is inspired by the linear shift deterministic
model and defined as
J =

0 0 0 · · · 0
1 0 0 · · · 0
0 1 0 · · · 0
... . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 · · · 0 1 0

p×p
. (7)
The following theorem estates the capacity characterization for this deterministic network.
Theorem 2. The capacity of the deterministic diamond network with adversarial node is given by
C = min
{
ψ(m1,m2, q1, q2)−max{q1, q2}, (m1 − q1)+ + n2,
(m2 − q2)+ + n1,max(n1, n2)
}
, (8)
where
Ψ(m1,m2, q1, q2) =
{
max{m1,m2, q1, q2} if m1 + q2 = m2 + q1
max{m1 + q2,m2 + q1} otherwise. (9)
In the following we will prove this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2:
a) The converse part: We first show that any achievable rate R satisfies R ≤ C. In order to do this, we show
that R is upper bounded by all the four terms in the minimization in (8). Assume we use code of length ", and W
can be decoded from Y ! with error probability #!, where #! → 0 as " grows. Therefore, using Fano’s inequality,
we have
H(X!|Y !) ≤ H(W |Y !) ≤ "#!. (10)
We denote by GX and GU the transfer matrix from the adversarial node and the source to the relays, respectively.
These matrices are defined as
GX =
[
M1
M2
]
, GU =
[
Q1
Q2
]
. (11)
So, the signals received by the relays can be written as[
Y1
Y2
]
= GX,U
[
X
U
]
(12)
where GX,U = [GX |GU ] is the transfer matrix from A and S to the relay nodes. We use fold face matrices, to
denote " copy of them, as the transfer matrix applied over a codeword of length ", e.g., GX,U = I! ⊗GX,U .
Note that the Markov chain X ! ↔ (Y !1 , Y !2 ) ↔ Y ! implies that the signals received at B1 and B2 are enough
to decode the message. It is also clear that once B1 and B2 can decode X, they also know GUU !. Hence,
H(X!,⊗GUU !|Y !1 , Y !2 ) ≤ "#!. Therefore,
"R+H(GUU !) = H(X!) +H(GUU !) = H(X!,GUU !)
≤ I(X!,GUU !;Y !1 , Y !2 ) + "#!
≤ H(Y !1 , Y !2 ) + "#! = rank(GX,U ) + "#!
= "rank(GX,U ) + "#! (13)
It is clear that the adversary can choose U ! such that H(GUU !) = "rank(GU ) = "max{q1, q2}. Therefore, we
have R ≤ rank(GX,U )−max{q1, q2} + #!. It only remains to show that rank(GX,U ) = Ψ(m1,m2, q1, q2), which
is a known fact from linear algebra, and we skip it here to sake of brevity. Note that this bound essentially captures
the maximum amount of information can be transmitted from through the cut Ω1 = {S,A}.
5In order to show that R ≤ (m1 − q1)+ + n2, we first recall that decodability of W from Y ! implies
H(X!,Q1U !|Y !1 , Y !) = H(X!|Y !1 , Y !) +H(Q1U !|X!, Y !1 , Y !)
≤ H(W |Y !1 , Y !) +H(Y !1 −M1X!|X!, Y !1 , Y !)
≤ "#!. (14)
Hence,
"R+H(Q1U !) = H(X!) +H(Q1U !)
(a)
= H(X!,Q1U !)
≤ I(X!,Q1U !;Y !1 , Y !) + "#!
≤ H(Y !1 , Y !) + "#!)
= H(Y !1 ) +H(Y
!|Y !1 ) + "#!
(b)
≤ H(Y !1 ) +H(N2X!2|Y !1 ) + "#!
≤ H(Y !1 ) +H(N2X!2) + "#!
≤ "max{m1, q1}+ "n2 + "#!. (15)
where in (a) we used the assumption that the adversary does not know the message, and therefore, its interfering
signal is independent of X !, and (b) holds since X !1 is a function of Y !! . Combining (15) with the fact that the
adversarial node can make H(Q1U !) as large as "q1, gives the second bound. It is worth mentioning that this
bound essentially captures the maximum flow of information through the cut Ω = {S,A,B1}. The proof of the
third bound is just repeating the same argument for a symmetric situation.
Finally, in order to proof the last inequality, we consider Ω = {S,A,B1, B2}. It is clear that
"R ≤ H(X!) ≤ I(X!;Y !) + "#!
≤ H(Y !) + "#! ≤ "max{n1, n2} + "#!. (16)
b)The achievability part: In the following we present an encoding scheme to achieve rates any R ≤ C. Note
that is only a proof sketch, and we may skip the details due to lack of space. The idea is provide enough number
of linearly independent equations about message codeword. Note that some of sub-nodes in B 1 and B2 receive the
same bit from A, and therefore this interfering bit can get neutralized [6] if they get forwarded and received on
the same sub-node of D.
We split the message into two parts, which essentially leads to a network decomposition, based on the sub-levels
of each node which are involved in transmitting each of the sub-messages. We first identify the maximum number of
bits of the message can be neutralized using this technique. Any sub-level which is involved in such neutralization
would belong the first network partition.
There are also possibly a subset of message bits received at the relays above the interference level, and therefore
not corrupted with interference. These bits can be directly forwarded to the destination. This idea is illustrated in
Figure 3.
We use R(N) and R(P ) to denote the number of equations can be received at the destination using interference
neutralization, and forwarding pure signal bits from the relays, respectively.
We denote the levels of B1 at the receiver side by Y1,1 (for the highest) to Y1,p (for the lowest), and similarly
for B2. Define
δ ! min
{
q1, q2
}−min{(q1 −m1)+, (q2 −m2)+}.
It is easy to show that Y1,(p−(q1−q2)++κ) and Y2,(p−(q2−q1)++κ) are corrupted by the same bit from A, for κ =
0, . . . , δ − 1. Moreover, at least one of Y1,(p−(q1−q2)++κ) and Y2,(p−(q2−q1)++κ) receive a bit from the source.
Therefore, for each κ, if Y1,(p−(q1−q2)++κ) and Y2,(p−(q2−q1)++κ) can get forwarded on the same destination sub-
node, the destination receives an equation about the source whose interference is neutralized. It is worth mentioning
that if m1 + q2 = m2 + q1, then the neutralized equations received at D are zero, since the message bits would be
also neutralized. On the other hand, the condition m1 + q2 '= m2 + q1 guarantees that such received legitimate bits
are different.
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Fig. 3. Transmission strategy to provide interference neutralization.
Each bit neutralization utilizes one sub-link for B1 to D, and one sub-link from B2 to D. Hence, we can send
up to
R(N) ≤ ν !
{
0 if m1 + q2 = m2 + q1
min{δ, n1, n2} otherwise. (17)
On the other hand, nodes B1 and B2, respectively, receive (m1 − q1)+ and (m2 − q2)+ bits from the source
which are above the interference level, and therefore not corrupted. These bits can be forwarded to D through the
remaining (n1 − ν) and (n2 − ν) links in the second layer of the network. However, these two set of bits have
overlap, since they both are the upper level bits sent by A. Analysis of the number of non-interfered bits can be
sent to the destination node, is equivalent to a study of another linear shift deterministic diamond network without
adversary, where there are (m1− q1)+ and (m2− q2)+ links from S to the relays, and (n1− ν) and (n2− ν) links
from the relays to the destination. The capacity of this network is easy to compute as in [3]. We get
R(P ) ≤ min{max{(m1 − q1)+, (m2 − q2)+}, (m1 − q1)+ + (n1 − ν),
(m2 − q2)+ + (n2 − ν),max{n2 − ν, n2 − ν}
}
. (18)
It is easy to show that equations we receive using two method are linearly independent, and therefore any rate
R ≤ R(N) + R(P ) is achievable. Using some algebra and manipulations, one can show that adding the RHS’s of
(17) and (18), gives us the same bound claimed in the theorem.
In the following example we discuss this network decomposition idea in more details.
Example 1. Consider a diamond network with parameters m1 = 4, m2 = 6, q1 = 3, q2 = 2, n1 = 5, and n2 = 4.
Also assume p = 7. Theorem 2 implies that C = 5. In the following we show how the destination can get 5 linearly
independent equations about the bits transmitted by the source node. Denoting the source and interference bits by
Xi and uj , for i = 1, . . . , 6, and j = 1, 2, 3, we have
Y1 =

Y11
Y12
Y13
Y14
Y15
Y16
Y17

=

0
0
0
X1
X2 + U1
X3 + U2
X4 + U3

, Y2 =

Y21
Y22
Y23
Y24
Y25
Y26
Y27

=

0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5 + U1
X6 + U2

.
7Recall that we can neutralize up to ν = min{δ, n1, n2} = 2 bits. This will be done by forwarding Y15 and Y16 by
B1 and Y26 and Y27 by B2 over the lowest 2 links to D. The destination node will receive Y6 = X2 + X5 and
Y7 = X3 +X6 on its lowest level.
the relay node B1 has only one bit of non-corrupted signal, X1 and node B2 has four of them, X1, X2, X3, and
X4. In order to send these bits, X send X1 on its highest level, and B2 forwards X2 and X3 on its highest levels.
Note that, we cannot decode all the six bits, but obtain five linearly independently equations involving X 1, . . . ,X6.
IV. THE GAUSSIAN NETWORK: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The upper bound:: We imitate the same bounding techniques we used to prove Theorem 2. We first start
with the cut Ω = {S,A}. Recall that the worst distribution the adversary can use for its signal is the Gaussian
distribution [10].
"R ≤ I(y!1, y!2;x!) + "#! = h(y!1, y!2)− h(y!1, y!2|x!) + "#!
≤ "
2
log
(
1 + g1 + g2 + f1 + f2 + (
√
f1g2 −
√
f2g1)2
1 + g1 + g2
)
+ "#!. (19)
The second bound is easy to derive.
"R ≤ I(y!1, y!;x!) + "#!
= I(y!1;x
!) + I(y!;x!|y!1) + "#!
= I(y!1;x
!) + h(y!|y!1)− h(y!|x!, y!1) + "#!
≤ I(y!1;x!) + h(y!|x!1)− h(y!|x!1, x!2) + "#! (20)
= I(y!1;x
!) + h(
√
h2x
!
2 + z
!|x!1)− h(y!|x!1, x!2) + "#!
≤ I(y!1;x!) + h(
√
h2x
!
2 + z
!)− h(y!|x!1, x!2) + "#!
≤ "
2
log
(
1 +
f1
1 + g1
)
+
"
2
log(1 + h2) + "#!. (21)
where in (20) we used the fact that x!1 is a function of y!1, and also the Markov chain y! ↔ (x!1, x!2) ↔ (x!, y!1).
The third bound can be proved by repeating the same argument for I(y !2, y!;x!).
In order to show the last upper bound, we can write
"R ≤ I(y!;x!) + "#!
≤ I(y!;x!1x!2) + "#! (22)
≤ "
2
log
(
1 + (
√
h1 +
√
h2)2
)
. (23)
We again used the data processing inequality for the Markov chain y ! ↔ (x!1, x!2)↔ x! in (22).
The proof for the inner bound:: The achievability scheme we propose here is induced by the strategy proposed
for the deterministic model. It is based on message splitting and superposition coding. The power allocation should
be performed such that the part of the message which is not corrupted by interference can be decoded at the relays.
Moreover, the interfered part get forwarded to the destination such that the effective interference at the destination
be small enough such that this part of the message can be decoded at the destination. In the following we only
explain this idea in more details.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the relay B1 is stronger than B2, i.e., SINR1 ≥ SINR2, where
SINRi = fi/(1 + gi). We first split the message W into three parts, namely, Wc,Wp,Wn, with rates Rc, Rp, and
Rn. Our encoding and decoding strategy guarantees that the common message,W c, can be decoded at both relays,
while the private sub-message, Wp, can be only decoded at B1. However, neither of the relays can decode the
neutralization sub-message, Wn, and it can be only decoded at the destination, once the interference is neutralized.
We use three random codebooks of rates Rc, Rp, and Rn, generated according to the Gaussian distribution with
unit variance. The source maps its sub-messages to the codewords from corresponding codebooks, and obtains x c,
8xp, and xn. Then the signal transmitted by the source is formed as a super position of the three codewords, using
a proper power allocation,
x =
√
αcxc +
√
αpxp +
√
αnxn, (24)
where the power allocation coefficients satisfy
αc + αp + αn ≤ 1. (25)
In particular, we choose αn = min(1, 1/SINR1), αp = min(1, 1/SINR2)−αn, and αc = 1−αn−αp, which clearly
satisfy the power constraint at the transmitter.
The relay nodes receive
y1 =
√
f1αcxc +
√
f1αpxp +
√
f1αnxn +
√
g1u+ z1
y2 =
√
f2αcxc +
√
f2αpxp +
√
f2αnxn +
√
g2u+ z2. (26)
Both nodes B1 and B2, first decodes xc treating everything else as noise. Note that assuming randomized coding,
this Wc can be decoded at B1 and B2 as long as Rc < Rc,1 and Rc < Rc,2, where
Rc,1 !
1
2
log
(
1 + f1 + g1
1 + f1(αn + αp) + g1
)
Rc,2 !
1
2
log
(
1 + f2 + g2
1 + f2(αn + αp) + g2
)
=
1
2
log
(
1 + f2 + g2
1 + min(f1, g2 + 1) + g2
)
>
1
2
log
(
1 + f2 + g2
2(1 + g2)
)
=
1
2
log (1 + SINR2)− 12 . (27)
It is easy to show that Rc,1 > Rc,2. Therefore, any common rate satisfying
Rc <
(
1
2
log (1 + SINR2)− 12
)+
(28)
is achievable for the relays.
Once xc is decoded, B1 can cancel it from its received signal, and decode xp treating xn, u and z1 as noise.
This can be done if and only if Rp < Rp,1, where
Rp,1 !
1
2
log
(
1 + f1(αp + αn) + g1
1 + f1αn + g1
)
>
1
2
log (1 + SINR1)− 12 log (1 + SINR2)−
1
2
. (29)
Therefore, any private rate satisfying
Rp <
(
1
2
log (1 + SINR1)− 12 log (1 + SINR2)−
1
2
)+
(30)
is achievable.
The operation at the relays in order to generate their transmitting signals is just to allocate proper power to their
available different components. Note that the remaining (uncoded) parts of the signals will be also used for forming
the transmitting signal. The relays nodes B1 and X2, send
x1 =
√
βcxc +
√
βpxp +
√
βn
y1 −
√
f1αcxc −
√
f1αpxp√
f1αn + g1 + 1
x2 =
√
γcxc −√γn y2 −
√
f2αcxc√
f2αp + f2αn + g2 + 1
, (31)
9where again the power coefficients satisfy
βc + βp + βn ≤ 1
γc + γn ≤ 1.
Finally the decoder receivers a noisy linear combination of x1 and x2 over the multiple access channel. The signal
received at the destination node can be written as
y =
√
h1x1 +
√
h2x2 + z
=
(√
h1βc +
√
h2γc
)
xc +
(√
h1βp −
√
h2γnf2αp
f2(αp + αn) + g2 + 1
)
xp
+
(√
h1βnf1
f1αn + g1 + 1
−
√
h2γnf2
f2(αp + αn) + g2 + 1
)
√
αnxn
+
(√
h1βng1
f1αn + g1 + 1
−
√
h2γng2
f2(αp + αn) + g2 + 1
)
u
+
(√
h1βn
f1αn + g1 + 1
z1 −
√
h2γn
f2(αp + αn) + g2 + 1
z2 + z
)
. (32)
In order to seek of simplicity, we denote the received power of xc, xp, xn and u by Pc, Pp, Pn, and Pu,
respectively. We also use N to denote the received noise power at the destination.
We can choose the power allocation coefficients arbitrarily. In particular, we can set them such that
η ! h1βn(g1 + 1)
f1αn + g1 + 1
=
h2γn(g2 + 1)
f2(αp + αn) + g2 + 1
. (33)
Note that
η <
h1βn(g1 + 1)
g1 + 1
= h1βn. (34)
We also have f1αn ≤ f1/SINR1 = g1 + 1, which implies
η ≥ h1βn(g1 + 1)
2(g1 + 1)
= h1βn/2. (35)
Therefore, η is sandwiched by
h1βn/2 ≤ η < h1βn, (36)
and similarly,
h2γn/2 ≤ η < h2γn. (37)
Using this new notation, we can rewrite the power of neutralization part and the jamming signal as
Pn = αn
(√
h1βnf1
f1αn + g1 + 1
−
√
h2γnf2
f2(αp + αn) + g2 + 1
)2
= αnη
(√
SINR1 −
√
SINR2
)2
, (38)
and
Pu =
(√
h1βng1
f1αn + g1 + 1
−
√
h2γng2
f2(αp + αn) + g2 + 1
)2
= η
(√
g1
g1 + 1
−
√
g2
g2 + 1
)2
. (39)
Similarly, the total power of the noise would be
N =
h1βn
f1αn + g1 + 1
+
h2γn
f2(αp + αn) + g2 + 1
+ 1 = η(
1
g1 + 1
+
1
g2 + 1
) + 1. (40)
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The first task of the destination is to jointly decode Wc and Wp, treating xn and u as noise. This can be done
as long as
Rc ≤ 1" I(y;xc|xp),
Rp ≤ 1
"
I(y;xp|xc),
Rc +Rp ≤ 1
"
I(y;xcxp).
The total noise and interference for decoding xc and xp is upper bounded by
Pn + Pu +N ≤ (
√
h1βn +
√
h2γn)2 + 1 < 8η + 1, (41)
where we used (36) and (37) in the last inequality. Therefore, the decodability conditions for x c and xp can be
further tightened, and rewritten as
Rp ≤ 12 log
(
h1 + 1
8η + 1
)
(42)
Rc +Rp ≤ 12 log
(
h1 + h2 + 1
8η + 1
)
. (43)
Combining (28), (30), (42), and (43), gives the following achievable rate.
Rc +Rp ≤ min
{1
2
log (1 + SINR1)− 1,
1
2
log (1 + SINR2) +
1
2
log (1 + h1)− 12 log(1 + 8η)−
1
2
,
1
2
log (1 + h1 + h2)− 12 log(1 + 8η)
}
. (44)
One xc and xp are decoded, the destination node can remove them and decode xn. In order to do this, it has to
treat u as noise. Note that, xn is decodable as long as Rn ≤ Rn, where
Rn !
1
2
log
(
1 +
Pn
Pu +N
)
=
1
2
log
1 + αnη (√SINR1 −√SINR2)2
η
(√
g1
g1+1
−
√
g2
g2+1
)2
+ η( 1g1+1 +
1
g2+1
) + 1

(45)
It is easy to show that (√
g1
g1 + 1
−
√
g2
g2 + 1
)2
<
1
min(g1, g2) + 1
(46)
and
1
g1 + 1
+
1
g2 + 1
≤ 2
min(g1, g2) + 1
. (47)
Therefore, we have
Rn >
1
2
log
1 + αnη (√SINR1 −√SINR2)2
η
(
3
min(g1,g2)+1
)
+ 1
 . (48)
We can further show that
Rn ≥ min
{
1
2
log
(
1 +
αn(min(g1, g2) + 1)
(√
SINR1 −
√
SINR2
)2
3
)
,
1
2
log
(
1 +
η
2
)}
. (49)
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In the next step, we can prove
(min(g1, g2) + 1)
(√
SINR1 −
√
SINR2
)2 ≥ (√f1g2 −√f2g1)2
3(g1 + g2 + 1)
. (50)
Hence,
Rn ≥ min
{
1
2
log
(
1 +
αn
(√
f1g2 −
√
f2g1
)2
9(g1 + g2 + 1)
)
,
1
2
log (1 + 8η)− 2
}
. (51)
Summing up (44) and (51), we get the total achievable rate. It is worth mentioning that
1
2
log(1 + SINR1) +
1
2
log
(
1 +
αn
(√
f1g2 −
√
f2g1
)2
9
)
≥ 1
2
log
(
1 + SINR1 +
(√
f1g2 −
√
f2g1
)2
9(g1 + g2 + 1)
)
≥ 1
2
log
(
1 + 2SINR1 +
(√
f1g2 −
√
f2g1
)2
g1 + g2 + 1
)
− 1
2
log 18
≥ 1
2
log
(
1 + SINR1 + SINR2 +
(√
f1g2 −
√
f2g1
)2
g1 + g2 + 1
)
− 1
2
log 18
≥ 1
2
log
(
1 +
f1 + f2 +
(√
f1g2 −
√
f2g1
)2
g1 + g2 + 1
)
− 1
2
log 18
where in the first inequality we used the fact that
(1 + SINR1)αn = (1 + SINR1)min
(
1,
1
SINR1
)
= min
(
1 + SINR1, 1 +
1
SINR1
)
≥ 1. (52)
APPENDIX
A. Discussion on Ψ(m1,m2, q1, q2)
Consider a block matrix with shift matrix block as
G =
[
Jp−m1 Jp−q1
Jp−m2 Jp−q2
]
.
We can, without loss of generality assume that m1 = max{m1,m2, q1, q2} = p. Let r denote the rank of this
matrix, and our goal is to prove that r = Ψ(m1,m2, q1, q2), defined in (9). Therefore, G can be written as a product
of two full-rank matrices as
G = G1G2 =
[
I Jm1−q1
Jm1−m2 Jm1−q2
]
=
[
I 0
Jm1−m2 G′1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
[
I Jm1−q1
0 G′2
]}
r
where I is the identity matrix of size p× p and 0 is the zero matrix of size p× (r− p). Moreover, G1 and G2 are
full-rank matrices which satisfy
J2m1−m2−q1 +G1G2 = Jm1−q2 .
It is clear that the fact that G1 is full-rank, implies G′1 is also full-rank, and moreover, the first p columns and the
last (r − p) columns of G1 are linearly independent. Therefore, r = rank(G1) = p+ rank(G′1).
Note that if m1+ q2 = m2 + q2, then 2m1−m2− q1 = m1− q2, and G1 = G2 = 0. Recall that G1 and G2 are
full-rank. So, they should have zero columns, and hence r = m1, in this case.
On the other hand, if m1 + q2 '= m2 + q2, then G′1G′2 = Jm1−q2 − J2m1−m2−q1 , and
rank(G′1G
′
2) = max{p − (m1 − q2),m1 − (2m1 −m2 − q1)}.
Since G′1 and G′2 are also full-rank, each of them is of the same rank. Therefore,
r = p+ rank(G′1) = m1 +max{q2,m2 + q1 −m1} = max{m1 + q2,m2 + q1}.
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B. Evaluation of R(N) +R(P )
Note that combining (17) and (18), we conclude any rate satisfying
R ≤ ν +min{max{(m1 − q1)+, (m2 − q2)+}, (m1 − q1)+ + (n1 − ν),
(m2 − q2)+ + (n2 − ν),max{n2 − ν, n2 − ν}
} (53)
is achievable.
First assume m1 + q2 = m2 + q2. In this case, from (17) we have ν = 0. Therefore, (53) can be written as
R ≤ min{(m1 − q1)+, (m1 − q1)+ + n1, (m2 − q2)+ + n2,max{n2, n2}}.
It remains to show that (m1 − q1)+ = max{m1,m2, q1, q2} − max{q1, q2}, which is straight-forward, since we
assumed m1 + q2 = m2 + q1.
In the second case, where m1 + q2 '= m2 + q2, we have ν = min{n1, n2, δ}. Therefore, (53) can be written as
R ≤ min{max{(m1 − q1)+, (m2 − q2)+}+ ν, (m1 − q1)+ + n1, (m2 − q2)+ + n2,max{n2, n2}}
= min
{
max{(m1 − q1)+, (m2 − q2)+}+min{δ, n1, n2}, (m1 − q1)+ + n1, (m2 − q2)+ + n2,max{n2, n2}
}
= min
{
max{(m1 − q1)+, (m2 − q2)+}+ δ, (m1 − q1)+ + n1, (m2 − q2)+ + n2,max{n2, n2}
} (54)
where the last equality holds, since if δ = n1 then the first expression is always greater than or equal to the second
term, and does not appear in the minimization result. Similarly if δ = n2. Now, without loss of generality, we can
assume that m1 + q2 > m2 + q1, and conclude (m1 − q1)+ ≥ (m2 − q2)+. Hence,
δ +max{(m1 − q1)+, (m2 − q2)+} = min{q1, q2}−min{(q1 −m1)+, (q2 −m2)+}
+max{(m1 − q1)+, (m2 − q2)+}
= (q1 + q2 −max{q1, q2})− (q1 −m1)+ + (m1 − q1)+
= (q1 + q2 −max{q1, q2})− (max{q1,m1}−m1) + (max{q1,m1}− q1)
= q1 + q2 −max{q1, q2}+m1 − q1
= m1 + q2 −max{q1, q2}
= max{m1 + q2,m2, q1}−max{q1, q2}. (55)
Replacing this in the (55) in (54) gives us the desired result.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Ahlswede, “Elimination of correlation in random codes for arbitrarily varying channels,” Z. Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie Verw. Gebiete,
vol. 44, pp. 159–175, 1978.
[2] A. S. Avestimehr, S. N. Diggavi, and D. N. C. Tse, “Wireless network information flow: A deterministic approach,” 2009, submitted
to IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, Available from http://arxiv.org/pdf/0906.5394.
[3] A. Avestimehr, S. Diggavi, and D. Tse, “A deterministic approach to wireless relay networks,” in Proceedings of Allerton Conference
on Communication, Control, and Computing, Illinois, USA, Sept. 2007.
[4] R. Koetter and F. Kschischang, “Coding for errors and erasures in random network coding,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, pp.
3579–3591, Aug. 2008.
[5] S. Jaggi, M. Langberg, S. Katti, T. Ho, D. Katabi, M. Me´dard, and M. Effros, “Resilient network coding in the presence of byzantine
adversaries,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, pp. 2596–2603, June 2008.
[6] S. Mohajer, S. N. Diggavi, C. Fragouli, and D. Tse, “Transmission techniques for relay-interference networks,” in Proceedings of
Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Illinois, USA, Sept. 2008.
[7] S. Mohajer, S. N. Diggavi, , and D. Tse, “Approximate capacity of a class of gaussian relay-interference networks,” in Proceedings of
IEEE Int. Symp. Inform. Theory, Seoul, Korea, July 2009.
[8] K. Gomadam and S. A. Jafar, “The effect of noise correlation in amplifyand-forward relay networks,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 731–745, Feb. 2009.
[9] S. M. H. T. Yazdi and M. R. Aref, “The capacity of a class of linear deterministic networks,” 2010, available from
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1001.2164.
[10] S. Diggavi and T. Cover, “The worst additive noise under a covariance constraint,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 47, pp. 3072–3081,
July 2001.
